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Drug Testing of Athletes and the United
States Constitution: Crisis and Conflict
J. Otis Cochran*
I. Introduction
Historically, people engaged in physical activities of a sporting
nature have included those obsessed with demonstrating exceptional
physical superiority.' This obsession with physical prowess seems to
have fueled the history of what we now call "doping." The term
"doping" describes any artificial method of temporarily improving
athletic performance, either during training or competition.' It has
been suggested that the first recorded incidence of doping occurred
in the Garden of Eden when Adam and Eve believed the forbidden
fruit would give them God-like powers.3 In any event, humans have
long searched for a "gimmick" or "an easy way" or that "special
something extra."' Although there are no shortcuts to an excellent
performance, it is apparently human nature to keep searching for
them.'
Although doping is not an exclusively American problem,6 dop-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1968,
Morehouse College; J.D., Yale University, 1971.
1. During the Olympic Games, athletes of Ancient Greece ate sesame seeds that acted
as a stimulant. The legendary Bersekers in Norwegian mythology used bufotenine, while the
Andean Indians and Australian Aborigines chewed, respectively, coca leaves and the pituri
plant for stimulating and anti-fatiguing effects. See M. WILLIAMS, DRUGS AND ATHLETIC PER-
FORMANCE 6 (1974).
2. See 0. Boje, Doping, 8 Bull. Health Org. League of Nations (1939). After the Rome
Olympics in 1960, doping was defined as the pharmacological potentiation of athletic power
which aims to artificially increase the physiological efficiency of man or animal. See A. Vener-
ando, Doping: Pathology and Ways to Control It, 3 MEDICINA DELLO SPORT 972 (1963).
3. T.Z. Csaky, Doping, 12 J. SPORTS MED. AND PHYS. FITNESS 117, 120 (1972).
4. See Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973) (statement of Dr. Donald L. Cooper).
5. Id.
6. Athletes in Latin America, West Africa and South America have used substances
that range from harmless leaves to powerful poisons to enhance performance. See Boje, A
Study of Means Employed to Raise the Level of Performance in Sports, 8 BULL. HEALTH
ORG. LEAGUE OF NATIONS 445 (1969).
Historically, European athletes used drugs not only to improve their performances but
also to weaken their opponents. For example, in the sport of boxing, strychnine tablets, mix-
tures of brandy and cocaine, were used to achieve this result. See Prokop, The Struggle
Against Doping and Its History, 10 J. SPORTS MED. AND PHYS. FITNESS 45 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Prokop].
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ing among American athletes has received the most attention." This
national attention has uncovered a pervasive use of recreational
drugs as well as traditional performance enhancers. While there is
still grave concern about the physiological side effects of drugs taken
to increase endurance and aggressiveness, there is at least equal con-
cern about recreational drug use by athletes.' Whether drugs are
taken to celebrate a victory, to mark the signing of a contract, or
under any other circumstance, the recreational use of controlled sub-
stances" by athletes poses dangers similar to those posed by perform-
ance-enhancing drugs. These dangers range from impaired health to
death.1" Also of primary concern is the breakdown of ethics in ath-
letic competition."
The popularity of doping and recreational drug use by athletes
has resulted in serious action by sports and governmental authorities
to end abuse and to rehabilitate or punish abusers. 2 Various meth-
More recently, it has been reported that drug use is known to be common among athletes
in both the East and West and that drug abuse among Soviet sportsmen is widespread. See
generally About the Deaths of Those Soviet Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 8, 1984, at
11. See also How They're Keeping The Olympics Honest, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
Aug. 6, 1984, at 5; The Toughest Test For Athletes, TIME, June 25, 1984, at 61.
7. See Todd, The Steroid Predicament, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1983, at 62; E.
Magnuson, Baseball's Drug Scandal, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 126; B. Brubaker, Bittersweet,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 4, 1985, at 58; Biggs Begins Drug Rehab, Looks Toward Next
Fight, JET, Feb. 25, 1985, at 54; Looney, A Test With Nothing But Tough Questions, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 9, 1982, at 24; Goldsmith, Laws Provide Framework For Procedure, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1986, § 5 at 2, col. 3; Glasser, Right to Privacy is a Basic Principle, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1986, § 5, at 2, col. 1; F. Waterman, Player Agreement's "'Dead" After Public-
ity, The Daily Beacon, Jan. 31, 1986, at 9, col. 1; E. Brody and L. Weisman, Battle Lines
Drawn Over Rozelle Plan, USA Today, July 8, 1986, at C-I, col. 1.
8. Although mind-altering drugs have been used since ancient times, their use was gen-
erally restricted to religious and medicinal purposes. It is unclear exactly when recreational use
began. There is, however, some evidence that drugs were used socially before the birth of
Christ, but authorities report that widespread recreational use did not occur until much later.
In fact, widespread use of opium and cocaine did not occur until the mid-nineteenth century.
E.R. BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA: THE SECOND TRIP 24 (1971); J. KENNEDY, COCA ExOTICA 15
(1985); L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL REVOLUTION 19
(1976).
9. "Controlled substances" refers to any narcotic drug designated by federal or state
controlled substances acts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (5th ed. 1979).
10. One of the earliest fatalities resulting from doping was reported in 1886. During a
race between Paris and Bordeaux, an excessive dose of trimethyl caused an English cyclist's
death. See Prokop, supra note 6, at 45. On June 19, 1986, Len Bias, a twenty-two year old
basketball star who was the second selection overall in the 1986 National Basketball Associa-
tion's draft, died from a lethal dose of cocaine. R. Johnson, All-America Basketball Star,
Celtic Choice, Dies Suddenly, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Bias Killed by Cocaine,
Examiner Says, The Knoxville Journal, June 25, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
Eight days after Bias' death, Don Rogers, a twenty-three year old football player with the
Cleveland Browns, died of cardiac arrest induced by cocaine poisoning. D. Moore, Autopsy
Shows Deaths of Rogers, Bias Similar, USA Today, July 1, 1986, at C-3, col. 1.
11. See How They're Keeping the Olympics Honest, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
Aug. 6, 1984, at 25.
12. See Rozelle's Drug Program, The Knoxville News-Sentinel, July 14, 1986, at A-6,
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ods have been deployed in the effort to deter drug abusers. The most
common method for identifying athletes who abuse drugs is drug
testing.13
While strict measures must be taken to guard against drug
abuse by athletes, it is questionable whether drug testing is an ap-
propriate means to achieve that result. In fact, drug testing raises
significant legal issues, including an apparent conflict with funda-
mental constitutional rights. For example, does drug testing consti-
tute an unreasonable search or seizure?1" Do athletes have an abso-
lute expectation of privacy that precludes drug testing?15 Are there
due process and equal protection implications in drug testing?1" Does
drug testing violate the fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion?17 What policy considerations are involved in drug testing? In
addition to exploring the constitutional problems posed by drug test-
ing, this Article will examine the drug testing procedures used in
professional and amateur settings, and will discuss the dangers of an
unbridled adoption of drug testing as a method for combating drug
col. 1; Forbes, Browns' Model Renews Call For Random, Mandatory Drug Testing, USA
Today, June 30, 1986, at C-7; Note, Drugs, Athletes And The NCAA: A Proposed Rule For
Mandatory Drug Testing In College Athletics, 18 J. MAR. L. REv. 205 (1984) [hereinafter
Drugs, Athletes and the NCAA].
Copies of the drug testing programs of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the
National Basketball Association, the United States Olympic Committee, the National Football
League, and the Baltimore Orioles can be found in the Dickinson Law Review office.
13. The two most popular forms of drug testing are chromatography and immunoassay.
Chromatography is used to screen urine samples and is best described as follows:
Chromatography, an adsorption analysis, separates the chemical constituents of a sample
by their differential movements through a two-phase system. Comparing the peaks that corre-
spond to emergence of the compounds to a known standard allows presumptive identification of
a compound. In gas liquid chromatography (GLC), the moving phase is the gaseous state of a
sample, and the stationary phase is the liquid state. In thin-layer chromatography (TLC), the
sample is incorporated into a solvent that acts as the moving phase. The moving phase rises by
capillary action on a plate covered by a thin layer of cellulose or another inert material. See
Rovere, Haupt & Yates, Drug Testing in a University Athletic Program: Protocol and Imple-
mentation, THE PHYSICIAN AND SPORT MEDICINE 69, 71 April, 1986.
Immunoassay is a drug testing technique in which the reaction of an antiserum to a par-
ticular compound is tested against a sample. If the compound in question is in the sample, then
the amount of free antiserum will be diminished in proportion to the quantity of the compound
present. The antiserum is labeled with either radioisotopes or enzymes, and the amount of free
antiserum remaining is measured either with a radio immunoassay technique or with enzyme-
multiplied immunoassay technique. Id.
See also copies of the various drug testing programs (available in the offices of the Dickin-
son Law Review). Recently, the federal government filed an amicus brief in support of a Bos-
ton Police Department's drug-testing program that is being challenged by a police union on the
grounds that it violates the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable search and seizure. The
Justice Department is monitoring similar suits in other states. See Federal Government De-
fends Drug Tests To Court, Ogden Standard Examiner, Sept. 21, 1986, at I, col. 1.
14. See infra notes 33-74 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 152-185 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
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use among athletes. Finally, this Article will propose viable alterna-
tives to across-the-board drug testing and will suggest that most le-
gal arguments surrounding the drug testing issue are policy-based
and symptomatic of larger societal problems.
II. Illegal Drug Use in Sports: The Crisis
To understand the legal implications of drug testing, it is first
necessary to understand the drug abuse problems of athletes. The
extent of such drug use is difficult to quantify." While it is a general
perception that drug abuse is pervasive, experts widely disagree on
whether or not drug abuse by athletes has increased dramatically in
recent years.' 9 Regardless of the statistics, increased media attention
on both sports and individual athletes clearly heightened public
awareness of drug abuse problems among athletes."0
In the past thirty years, changes in the nature of the American
media have brought the problem of drug use by athletes under even
closer public scrutiny. Not only has the media allotted increased
broadcast time and resources to athletics, but it has also improved its
means of gathering and disseminating information. 2' As a result, the
media is increasingly intruding into the lives of all public figures,
including athletes. The press has the capability to transform rela-
tively unknown athletes into public figures. This increased media at-
tention, coupled with more extensive coverage of athletes, has re-
sulted in an unwritten code of athletic conduct. 2 This code does not
tolerate performance-enhancing or recreational drug use by athletes.
Although the public disapproves of drug use by athletes, it still
exists. According to one report, at least forty-two professional ath-
letes sought treatment for alcoholism or drug dependency between
18. Drugs, Athletes, and the NCAA, supra note 12, at 207.
19. Id. at n. 11. See The Scenario Leading Up To Rozelle's Plan, the Atlanta Constitu-
tion, July 8, 1986, at D-3, col. I, for an excellent chronology of drug-related events in the
world of sports in 1986. According to one report, at the NFL camp in New Orleans in Febru-
ary, 1986, sixteen percent of the nation's top seniors tested positive when given a drug test. In
a two year study concluded in 1985, more than fifty-five percent of Michigan State Univer-
sity's athletes tested positive, with seventeen percent showing cocaine use. See W. Robinson,
Remarks at the Entertainment Law Seminar at the University of Tennessee (April 4, 1985)
(on file at the University of Tennessee Law Library).
20. See Gooden and Society, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1987, § I at 27, col. 1; Gooden's Fall
From Grace, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1987, § 2 at I, col. 2.
21. See Hyams, Drug Use In Sports Is Forcing Athletes To Play By New Rules, Knox-
ville News Sentinel, April 6, 1986, at C-3, col. 1. See also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying
text.
22. Athletes, the new American heroes, are expected to conduct themselves responsibly
and ethically. See Gooden and Society, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1987, § I at 27, col. 1.
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January 1977 and July 1986,2a and no less than twenty-three profes-
sional athletes were convicted of drug- or alcohol-related crimes dur-
ing the same period.24 Statements by the FBI's national coordinator
for gambling and sports bribery investigations are even more alarm-
ing: he believes there is a strong possibility that a number of athletes
might fix games or shave points because of their heavy use of co-
caine.2 5 Athletes have admitted publicly that the use of perform-
ance-enhancing drugs is widespread. Buck Williams, a player with
the New Jersey Nets, estimated that twenty to thirty percent of the
National Basketball Association players use such drugs.2 6
The initial response of the management and owners of athletic
league franchises, as well as of amateur athletic associations and
educational institutions, was to make counseling and drug rehabilita-
tion services available to athletes on a voluntary basis. The counsel-
ing and drug rehabilitation programs represented attempts to inter-
nalize the problem and keep it from the press. Nevertheless, the
problem could not be hidden."
As the media began to inform the public that the use of drugs
by athletes was widespread; the leagues, sports associations and col-
leges started to take more drastic measures to deal with the problem.
They imposed sanctions, fines and even suspensions on those athletes
whose drug use was reported by the press. But even these measures
could not solve the problem. When public attention and media cover-
age brought reports that improper drug use by athletes had reached
a crisis in American sports, the quest for a better solution began.
The public demanded reassurance that its sports personalities were
not using sports to support self-destructive addiction. As public pres-
sure mounted; leagues, sports associations and colleges introduced
drug testing as a possible solution to the athlete drug problem. Al-
though perhaps attractive at first glance, drug-testing has far-reach-
ing ramifications that must be critically examined.28
23. Drug Addiction: The Costs to Sports Keep Growing, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1986, § 3
at 6, col. 5.
24. id.
25. Drugs Called Bribe Lure, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1986, § 2 at 17, col. 1.
26. D. Begel, The Difficulty of Treating the Drug Abusing Athlete, N.Y. Times, Febru-
ary 13, 1986, § 5 at 2, col. 1.
27. Id.
28. Although this Article focuses primarily upon drug testing of athletes, the author
recognizes that similar constitutional issues are raised by public sector drug testing. Notably,
in March 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime recommended mandatory
drug testing of all federal employees. The commission's findings have touched off an explosive
debate over the constitutionality of widespread drug testing. See Mandatory Drug Testing In
The Workplace, 72 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1986, at _. See also Chineson, Mandatory Drug Test-
ing: An Invasion of Privacy?, TRIAL, Sept. 1986, at 91.
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As one response to the deaths of Len Bias and Don Rogers, 9
coaches, players and owners called for increased drug testing. Art
Model, owner of the Cleveland Browns, claimed that random tests
are the only way to deal with drug use because the players cannot
prepare for the tests by interrupting their drug use a few days prior
to the tests.3" Kevin McHale of the Boston Celtics believes that test-
ing will help players and should be endorsed because "we should not
protect drug users from being caught."31 Dr. Forrest Tennant, drug
advisor for the National Football League, said he could not under-
stand why anyone would refuse random urinalysis: "[W]e're talking
about a person's health, about addiction, the loss of lives, and injur-
ing a player on the field. From a medical standpoint it's hard for me
to understand any challenge to getting drugs out of the NFL." 2
While many policy arguments have been mounted in support of
and in opposition to drug testing, many legal questions have surfaced
as well. Implementation of a comprehensive drug testing program for
athletes may abrogate certain rights that are enjoyed by all persons
under the United States Constitution, such as the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; the fifth
amendment protection against deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, the privilege against self-incrimination;
the right of privacy, a right derived from the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights; and the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion under the law.
III. Professional Sports: Mandatory Drug Testing
A. Is Mandatory Drug Testing An Unconstitutional Search and
Seizure?
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."I' The fourteenth amendment
makes the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures applicable to the states."'
29. See supra note 10.
30. G. Forbes, Browns' Model Renews Call For Random, Mandatory Drug Testing,
USA Today, June 30, 1986, at C-7, col. I.
31. McHale: Set Tough Drug Policy, Knoxville News Sentinel, June 26, 1986, at D-6,
col. 1.
32. Drug Doc: Testing a Benefit, USA Today, July 8, 1986, at C-2, col. 1.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 44 (1968).
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The drafters of the Bill of Rights originally intended to alleviate
the evil of "general warrants," which were used to carry out indis-
criminate searches." Mandatory drug testing by urinalysis is clearly
a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment." Case law
indicates that collection of biological waste is a seizure in the "sense
that something. has been taken from the suspect.""7 The crucial
question is whether drug testing by urinalysis is an "unreasonable
search or seizure" under the fourth amendment.
The test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is inca-
pable of precise definition or mechanical application. 8 It requires a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion
of personal rights.89 Few courts have addressed the issue of drug
testing and athletes within the context of a fourth amendment analy-
sis. However, several courts recently have applied this balancing test
to determine whether drug-testing procedures used by employers in-
fringe on the constitutional rights of their employees to be free from
unreasonable searches or seizures.40
Nearly all the cases involve public employees who objected to
the random procedure used by a municipality to test them for
drugs.4'1 With few exceptions, courts have struck down procedures
that called for random, universal drug testing of all employees. How-
ever, drug testing procedures such as urinalysis have been allowed by
the courts when conducted as part of a regularly scheduled medical
examination. Drug testing procedures have also been sustained
where there is reasonable suspicion based upon a showing of specific
objective facts that an employee is under the influence of a con-
trolled substance.
35. J.G. COOK, I CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3.1 at 292 (2d Ed. 1985)
[hereinafter COOK]; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985).
36. In Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), the court specifi-
cally addressed the issue of "whether the urinalysis test administered ...was a search or
seizure within the meaning of this amendment." Id. at 488. The court determined that urine
tests were analogous to breathalyzer tests, which repeatedly have been deemed searches. Id. at
488-89. See also McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), affd as modified
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1986); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985);
AFL-CIO v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Ewing v.
State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d 571 (1974).
37. See COOK, supra note 35, at § 3.20 at 467.
38. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J. 1985) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., McDonnel v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), affid as modi-
fied 802 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1986).
41. Id.
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In McDonnell v. Hunter,4 2 the plaintiff brought an action
against the Iowa Department of Corrections. Upon beginning his
employment with the Department in 1979, he signed a "consent to
search" form.43 On January 17, 1984, the Department told him he
would have to take a urinalysis test because he was seen with sus-
pected drug traffickers." He refused to take the test and was fired.4 5
The district court issued a restraining order and a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the Department from conducting the urinal-
ysis test unless the searching officials had reasonable suspicion, based
on specific objective facts and reasonable inferences, that the em-
ployee was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance."'
On review, the court of appeals held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in issuing the injunction.47 The Eighth Circuit
based its decision on an examination of four factors: 1) the threat of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff; 2) the balance between this harm
and the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on other
parties; 3) the probability that the plaintiff would succeed on the
merits; and 4) the public interest.48 The court stated that "the viola-
tion of privacy in being subjected to the searches and tests in ques-
tion is an irreparable harm that could reasonably be found to out-
weigh whatever increase in security the enforcement of the
Department's policies might produce."49
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman5" involved a similar situation.
Palm Bay appealed a final judgment permanently enjoining it from
requiring its police officers and fire fighters to submit to random
urine tests for determining the presence of controlled substances un-
less probable cause existed or the urinalysis was part of a regularly
scheduled periodic physical examination.5"
The district court of appeals reversed the trial court's determi-
nation that the city could only perform the tests upon a showing of
probable cause, and substituted "reasonable suspicion" as the consti-
tutionally required standard. 2 The court drew a distinction between
42. 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 786.
44. Id.
45. Id.




50. 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
51. Id. at 1323.
52. Id. at 1325-26. The reasonable suspicion test requires that officials point to specific
objective facts and rational inferences that they are entitled to draw from these facts in light
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routine periodic physical examinations and specific testing for drug
consumption, stating that the Bauman case did not involve urine
testing conducted as a part of an annual or other routine physical
examination. Certainly, municipal police officers and fire fighters
must be expected to meet required minimum standards of physical
condition in order to be hired and retained. 3 Thus, the Bauman
court sanctioned drug testing as an integral part of a routine physi-
cal examination, but apparently would oppose testing solely for the
purpose of determining improper use of drugs absent reasonable
suspicion.
In Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police,54 the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a police regula-
tion that required police officers suspected of drug abuse to be tested.
The court concluded that this type of drug testing procedure was
constitutional on its face.55 The court specifically limited its holding
to the publicly-employed law enforcement agent seeking constitu-
tional protection; its holding in Turner did not extend to the normal
constitutional requirements relating to private citizens. 56 Thus, the
court expressed no reservation in allowing police officers to submit to
drug testing.
Public school teachers have also been subjected to random drug
testing, and courts have held that the same "reasonable suspicion"
standard applies to them. In Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Education,57 probationary public school teach-
ers were required to undergo urinalysis to detect drug use. The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that their tests were
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment unless reasonable sus-
picion of drug use was involved."'
The court examined the teachers' expectation of privacy in light
of the nature of their profession. The court observed that certain in-
dustries, because of the greater likelihood of criminal involvement,
historically have been heavily regulated by the state; consequently
employees of those industries reasonably have a diminished expecta-
of their experience. It requires a showing of something less than probable cause. Id. at 1326.
53. Id. at 1324. The appellate court also concluded that the city had the right to adopt
"a policy which prohibits officials from using controlled substances at any time while they are
so employed, whether such use is on or off the job." Id. at 1326.
54. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
55. Id. at 1009.
56. Id.
57. 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986) affd No. 156 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 9,
1987).
58. 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
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tion of privacy. Intrusive testing by a governmental agency may be
permitted in these industries even in the absence of any articulated
individualized suspicion. 59 The court found the teaching profession to
be devoid of any diminished expectation of privacy that might be
present in other public industries; therefore, the mandatory drug
tests were illegal.6"
A diminished expectation of privacy was found to exist in the
horse racing industry. In Shoemaker v. Handel," professional jock-
eys challenged random drug testing by state officials as an unconsti-
tutional search and seizure. The regulations authorizing the search
required no degree of specialized suspicion and were randomly ap-
plied. The court held that the warrantless search was not unreasona-
ble per se because a legitimate governmental purpose rendered the
intrusion into privacy reasonable.6 2 Holding that the pervasiveness
and the regularity of a regulatory scheme are necessary to justify a
warrantless administrative search, the court concluded that horse
racing, like alcohol and firearms,63 satisfied the "pervasiveness"
criteria. 6 '
Although the Shoemaker court failed to provide an identifiable
pattern for establishing priorities, it did present a number of factors
to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the search in
the absence of individualized suspicions. These factors included the
legitimate purpose for the search,6" the reasonableness of the proce-
dures,66 the highly regulated nature of horse racing, ample notice of
the testing to participants, the state's interest in the safety of partici-
pants and honesty in the sport, procedural safeguards to prevent
abuses of discretion, and the effectiveness of the random tests as a
deterrent. After carefully weighing these factors, the court was per-
suaded that the drug tests did not violate the plaintiff's right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Although the Shoe-maker court did not set forth guidelines to determine the reasonable-
59. Id. at 39, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
60. Id.
61. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 1144.
63. Id. at 1142. Alcohol and firearms have long been held to be activities subject to
warrantless administrative searches. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), Colon-
nade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
64. In this regard, Shoemaker provides a basis upon which to distinguish college athlet-
ics because the nature of college activities does not justify warrantless searches as it may with
"suspect businesses" like casinos, government-sanctioned sports-betting, horse racing, alcohol,
or firearms.
65. "Legitimate purpose" refers to the integrity of the industry.
66. Arguably, urinalysis is deemed a lesser intrusion than other tests.
67. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143.
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ness of a test, it did provide a useful summary of the fourth amend-
ment analysis in the area of drug testing.68
In light of these decisions, it appears that mandatory drug test-
ing conflicts with fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures unless there is reasonable suspicion that sub-
stance abuse is present or the tests are part of a regularly scheduled,
periodic physical examination. This constitutional safeguard protects
most employees, including police officers, whose jobs require them to
be alert and available to the public at all times. Unless an employer
can point to specific, objective evidence that an employee is using a
controlled substance, he cannot be tested for drugs by that employer.
Courts have allowed exceptions when highly regulated, suspect busi-
nesses are involved.
69
Several analogies can be drawn between the municipal em-
ployee cases and drug testing in the sports industry. Because munici-
pal employees provide crucial public services, it is important that
they are free of drugs while performing these services. Nevertheless,
the courts have not yet required them to comply with unbridled
mandatory drug testing procedures. Therefore, it is logical to con-
clude that the courts would not require an athlete, who performs a
far less important service to the public, to comply with a mandatory
drug testing procedure, implemented by his or her employer, that is
devoid of constitutional safeguards.
The constitutionally mandated standard of proof established by
the courts for drug testing of public employees is "reasonable suspi-
cion" of substance abuse.70 To date, this is the minimum standard of
proof required; yet even this standard requires the employer to point
to specific, objective facts and rational inferences. 1 A court is un-
likely to require any less proof than "reasonable suspicion" before
permitting an employer of professional athletes to test a player for
drugs.
It appears from the municipal employee cases that a profes-
sional athlete can only be tested for controlled substances in two sit-
uations: either as part of a periodic, regularly scheduled medical ex-
amination, or if there is reasonable suspicion of drug use.7 Thus, it
68. This summary essentially said that the fourth amendment was not violated when the
state had a strong interest in the integrity of the persons being tested and when the testing
procedures were not open to administrative abuse. Id. at 1142-43.
69. See supra note 64.
70. See supra note 52. See also Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982).
71. Hunter, 672 F.2d at 674-75.
72. See Patchogue-Medford v. Board of Education, 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1986), affid, No. 156 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 9, 1987).
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would be constitutionally permissible for professional sports teams to
require their athletes to undergo weekly physical examinations dur-
ing the season. This approach, however, would be extremely burden-
some and time consuming. Similarly, athletes could be tested if a
reasonable suspicion exists that they are using a controlled sub-
stance, but this suspicion requires specific, objective facts provided
by the employer. The employer can make rational inferences to de-
rive these facts based on his own experience in his profession.7"
For example, if a player is habitually absent or late for a game
or practice, a court would probably allow the employer to test the
player based on a rational inference that the player might be abusing
drugs or alcohol. Based on his experience with behavior of this type,
the employer could point to the behavior as a specific indication of
drug abuse. The same inferences could also be drawn from other
types of behavior on the field, such as forgetfulness and extremely
poor play as compared with the athlete's usual performance."' By
pointing to specific indicia of substance abuse, it is conceivable that
an employer could test athletes for drugs without violating fourth
amendment rights.
B. The Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself . . .
The constitutional protection against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion was a response to historical practices such as judicial inquisi-
tions by the ecclesiastical courts and the proceedings of the Star
Chamber.76 These early courts placed a premium on compelling per-
sons to "admit guilt from their own lips."'77 The common law ex-
73. See McDonnell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirmance of preliminary
injunction).
74. A recent lawsuit between a professional baseball team and one of its players sup-
ports the belief that there may be a direct correlation between poor player performance and
drug use. In May 1986, the Pittsburgh Pirates filed a lawsuit against one of its former players,
Dave Parker. The Pirates argue that Parker's performance, i.e., his batting and his fielding,
steadily deteriorated during his five-year contract term because of the effects of heavy cocaine
use. According to the Pirates, Parker admitted that he was a heavy cocaine user while a player
with the Pirates but later quit because the cocaine was interfering with his performance on the
diamond. See Pirate Suit Against Parker Breaks New Legal Ground, JET, June 9, 1986, at 49.
See also Dave Parker, Baseball's First $1 Million Player, Now Ist To Be Sued Over His
Salary, JET, May 12, 1986, at 46.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
77. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470 (1976) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 440 (1974)).
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pressed the privilege as nemo tentur seipsum accusars (no one shall
be compelled to accuse himself) and courts have frequently held that
no principle of the common law is more firmly established than that
which affords a witness the privilege of refusing to answer any ques-
tion that will be self-incriminating.7 8 The fourteenth amendment
makes the protection against self-incrimination applicable to state
proceedings.9
Essentially, there are three elements of the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination: compulsion, communicative-
ness, and criminality. An analysis of each element is helpful in deter-
mining whether drug testing violates fifth amendment guarantees.
1. Compulsion.-Since voluntary drug testing has no fifth
amendment ramifications, the issue is whether mandatory drug test-
ing implicates the fifth amendment protection against compulsion.
Clearly, it does. Indeed, it is the involuntary nature of most drug
testing programs80 that concerns athletes.
2. Communicativeness.-The primary barrier to using the
fifth amendment privilege as a bar to mandatory drug testing is the
fundamental rule that self-incrimination is only a testimonial or
communicative privilege. In other words, the fifth amendment only
protects verbal8 l incriminations of oneself. Courts have interpreted
"witness" to mean one who incriminates himself orally or in writing.
As Justice Holmes succinctly explained in Johnson v. United
States,82 "a party is privileged from producing the evidence but not
from its production." 3 Thus, courts have held that when incriminat-
ing papers are apprehended from a third party or seized during a
valid search by police, the self-incrimination privilege is inappropri-
ate. Conversely, if the person is subpoenaed to produce the incrimi-
nating writings, the fifth amendment is properly invoked. The dis-
tinction is grounded on the theory that "the individual against whom
the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, produc-
78. Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897).
79. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47
(1967) ("The language of the Fifth Amendment [as to self-incrimination) [is] applicable to
the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, (and] is unequivocal and without
exception.").
80. Although the Baltimore Orioles adopted a voluntary drug testing program, most
drug testing programs in professional or collegiate sports are involuntary.
81. "Verbal" in this context includes gestures and movements intended to be substitutes
for verbal communication.
82. 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
83. Id. at 458.
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tion, or authentication of incriminating evidence." 4
The seminal case in this area is Schmerber v. California.5 In
Schmerber, the petitioner was hospitalized after an automobile acci-
dent.86 Noticing signs of intoxication, the investigating police officer
ordered the doctor to extract a blood sample from the petitioner
against his will. 87 Rejecting all constitutional objections, the court
held that
[the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination]
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testi-
monial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of
blood and use of the analysis [blood alcohol content tests] did
not involve compulsion to these ends.
8
The Court defined "testimonial or communicative" as spoken words
or physical gestures such as nodding 89 and rejected the dissent's ar-
gument that the fifth amendment should apply because the test was
performed in order to obtain the testimony of others. The Court held
that the privilege applied "only to acts on the part of the person to
whom the privilege applies .... "I"
The Court noted that history and a long line of lower court au-
thorities had consistently limited the privilege's protection to the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling testimony from the witness'
own mouth.91 In doing so, the Court relied on precedent rather than
clear reasoning or significant policy considerations. "Since the blood
test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was
neither the petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some com-
municative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible
on privilege grounds.'
Urinalysis testing for drugs falls squarely within the ambit of
the Schmerber rules as non-testimonial and non-communicative.
Therefore, it does not appear that a challenge based on the fifth
amendment would stand under controlling Supreme Court
84. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 474 (1976).
85. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
86. Id. at 758.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 761.
89. Id. at 761 n.5.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 763.
92. Id. at 765. The Court made it clear that compulsion which makes a suspect or ac-
cused the source of real or physical evidence does not violate the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Id. at 764. Under this analysis, compulsion of handwriting exemplars does not violate
the fifth amendment. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
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precedents. 93
3. Criminality.-The final requirement that courts have im-
posed on persons seeking the protection of the fifth amendment is
criminality: the evidence must relate to some conduct that is crimi-
nally punishable. 94
The criminality requirement, like communicativeness, is of little
value in resisting non-voluntary drug testing. The fifth amendment
operates only when the information sought to be extracted presents a
realistic threat of incrimination. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has held that disclosure of private information may be compelled if
immunity removes the risk of criminal prosecution.95 Finally, the
fifth amendment offers no protection against administrative sanc-
tions, which are not penal in nature. 6
Although valid constitutional objections to mandatory drug test-
ing of athletes may exist, case law clearly frustrates a valid fifth
amendment argument. Any other conclusion requires upsetting well-
settled precedents of the Supreme Court.
C. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
"Right of privacy" is a generic term encompassing various
rights recognized as inherent in the concept of ordered liberty.97 The
right to privacy prohibits governmental interference in intimate per-
sonal relationships or activities; it allows freedom of the individual to
make fundamental choices involving himself, his family and his rela-
tionships with others." The Supreme Court considers the right of
93. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Nevertheless, fifth amendment challenges to
drug testing continue. Cf. Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (prison's
program of drug testing did not violate fifth amendment rights); Walters v. Secretary of De-
fense, 725 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (compulsory drug testing in military does not offend fifth
amendment). See also Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Hoeppner v.
State, 379 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Newman v. Coughlin, 110 A.D.2d 981, 488
N.Y.S.2d 273 (1984) (urinalysis of prisoners approved over various constitutional objections,
no fifth amendment analysis). See generally Federal Government Defends Drug Tests to
Court, supra note 13.
94. Thus, the following questions would arise: (1) Would the mere presence of illegal
substances in a person's system subject him to criminal liability?; (2) Has the testing entity
warranted that the results of the test will not be made available to law enforcement authori-
ties; and (3) Will the results be used solely to determine eligibility?
95. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
96. See Kim v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960); see also Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.
Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985) (where the only result of drug testing would be civil administrative
penalty, the fifth amendment was not violated).
97. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (5th ed. 1979).
98. Id.
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privacy to be a fundamental right.9 Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority in Roe v. Wade,100 admitted that the constitution does
not explicitly mention a right of privacy. 101 Still, he believed that
such a fundamental right existed whether it was founded in the four-
teenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, or in the ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the
people.102 Regardless of the source of the right of privacy, it is clear
that such a fundamental constitutional right does, in fact, exist.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has applied strict judicial
scrutiny to cases in which a fundamental constitutional right or in-
terest is at stake.103 Since the right of privacy is a fundamental con-
stitutional right, any conduct or statute that interferes with that
right must meet the requirements of strict judicial scrutiny in order
to be upheld.104 Strict scrutiny presumes that the conduct or statute
conflicting with the fundamental right is unconstitutional. The con-
duct or statute will withstand scrutiny only if it is the least restric-
tive means tailored to compelling state interests. 10 5
The right of privacy has been successfully asserted to defeat a
proposed drug testing program for junior high school students."" In
Merriken v. Cressman,10 7 a junior high school student and his
mother brought an action to prevent the introduction of a proposed
drug testing program. The program was designed to identify poten-
tial drug abusers and to prepare certain necessary interventions, in-
cluding psychotherapy, for potential drug abusers. The plaintiffs
named the county commissioners, the area school board members,
the school superintendent, and the junior high school principal as
defendants. The Critical Period of Intervention (CPI) program pur-
ported to identify potential drug abusers through the use of detailed
questionnaires that inquired into many personal and private matters.
The court held that the CPI program was unconstitutional on the
ground that it violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy.10 8
In reaching its conclusion, the Merriken court focused on the
ultimate use of the information acquired by the defendants through
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 152.
102. Id. at 153.
103. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
104. Id. at 336.
105. Id. at 343.
106. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 922.
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the CPI. The court applied a balancing test in which it weighed the
invasion of privacy by the CPI program against the public need for a
program that would possibly prevent drug abuse. The court struck
the balance in favor of the right of privacy, reasoning that neither
the testing procedure nor the significance of the results had been suf-
ficiently presented to either the child or his parents. Furthermore,
the court was not persuaded that the test was reliable or credible, or
that it was genuinely fighting the drug problem. 10 9
Although the plaintiffs contended that the CPI program would
violate other constitutional rights, the Merriken court stated that im-
plementation of the program would violate no constitutional right
other than privacy."'
In Shoemaker v. Handel, the court's concern was whether ath-
letes have an absolute expectation of privacy that precludes drug
testing."' As previously noted," 2 the plaintiff-jockey brought an ac-
tion challenging New York State Racing Commission regulations
that provided for the administration of breathalyzer and random
urinalysis tests to all jockeys to test for alcohol and drug use. The
court upheld the challenged regulations because they did not violate
the plaintiff's right to privacy." 3
The Shoemaker court distinguished between two types of pri-
vacy interests: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters and the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions."' In the court's view, the former pri-
vacy interest, rather than the latter, was implicated. The court re-
ferred to that interest as one of "confidentiality."" 5 According to the
Shoemaker court, "[t]he right to privacy is not absolute. The state
has the power to compel disclosure of otherwise private information
when its interest in the information outweighs the individual's inter-
109. Id. at 921.
110. Id. The court further explained that a new state statute had rendered the self-
incrimination issue moot. This Pennsylvania statute attempted to prevent the use of informa-
tion, obtained confidentially from students, from being used against them in legal proceedings
without consent. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945 (Purdon 1982) for the statute in its
present form. The statute referred to by the Merriken court, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1319,
was repealed by the Judiciary Act Repealer Act, 1978 Pa. Laws 202, No. 53, § 2(a)(1260).
The present statute is substantially similar to the original § 13-1319.
Ill. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985).
112. See supra notes 61-64.
113. Other challenges included arguments that the regulations constituted an unreasona-
ble search and seizure, violated the jockey's right to due process and deprived him of equal
protection of the laws. Id.
114. Id. at 1105 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977)).
115. Id. at 1105.
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est in non-disclosure."11 6 The court articulated several factors which
it considered in evaluating the competing interests:
the type of record requested, the information it does or
might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent non-
consensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relation-
ship in which the record was generated, the adequacy of safe-
guards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need
for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest
militating towards access."'
In student athletics, the question of whether a given mandatory
drug testing program for student-athletes is violative of their consti-
tutional right of privacy depends chiefly on the intrusiveness of the
program. The most important factors to consider in weighing the de-
gree of intrusiveness for purposes of the right of privacy include the
means of testing," 8 the type of drugs for which the test is adminis-
tered, 1 9 who conducts the testing, 120 when testing is administered,'
2'
and notification of procedures used. 2 The possible variations for a
drug testing program are virtually limitless. Consequently, the con-
stitutionality of drug testing programs is likely to be capable of de-
termination only on a case-by-case basis.
116. Id. at 1106 (citing Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978)).
117. Id. (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d
Cir. 1980)).
118. Three bodily fluids may be the subject of drug testing procedures: blood, urine and
saliva. Each of these fluids involves a different type of drug testing procedure, and each in-
volves a different degree of intrusiveness. Clearly, lie detector tests and psychological tests are
so excessively intrusive as to be unconstitutional.
119. Several broad categories of drugs may be tested for, including performance-en-
hancers, street drugs, and dangerous drugs. There may be some overlapping between these
categories. But, it is clear that the greater the number of substances tested for, the more
intrusive the drug testing program is likely to become.
120. Drug testing procedures may be conducted by any number of persons, including
coaches, trainers, or independent laboratory technicians. In general, the more people who are
privy to the test results, the more intrusive the search.
121. Drug testing programs may provide for random testing, testing in conjunction with
the pre-season physical, follow-up testing once positive test results have occurred, or some
combination of these. In general, the greater the frequency of the tests, the more intrusive a
testing program is.
122. Notification procedures may be the single most important factor in determining the
constitutionality of a given drug testing program. Notification deals with the number of per-
sons who have access to drug testing results and how widely publicized the test results of
particular athletes become. In general, the greater the degree of publicity, the less likely that
the drug testing program will be constitutional.
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IV. Professional Sports: Drug Testing Programs
A. The National Basketball Association
A number of the professional athletic associations have already
instituted drug testing programs or are in the process of implement-
ing them. For example, the National Basketball Association (NBA)
announced a drug testing program in the spring of 1983.123 The pro-
gram stresses extensive educational and rehabilitative processes for
fighting drug abuse. 124 Pursuant to its agreement with the NBA
Players' Association, if a player has been convicted of, or pleads
guilty to, a crime involving the use or distribution of heroin or co-
caine,' 25 or if the league determines guilt through procedures out-
lined in the agreement, the player may be permanently dismissed
from the league. Three such infractions precipitate dismissal from
the NBA;'26 however, there is an appellate process that permits rein-
statement.1 27 According to attorneys for the NBA, two players have
been barred from the league for improper drug use. 2 '
123. Copies of the NBA's drug testing program are available in the offices of the Dick-
inson Law Review.
124. Id. at 1. The NBA program encourages voluntary treatment by providing for coun-
seling and medical assistance at the club's expense. Id.
125. The league focuses its concern primarily on cocaine and heroin because they appear
to pose the greatest threat. Id. at 2. The cocaine-related deaths of Len Bias and Don Rogers
reinforce the need to focus on cocaine abuse among athletes. See supra note 9 and accompany-
ing text. It should be noted, however, that cocaine abuse is a national problem and not a
problem confined to athletes. This is especially true since a new distillate of cocaine called
"crack" is now on the market. R. Smith, The Plague Among Us, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986,
at 15. With the advent of crack, cocaine has from four to five million users who come from the
nation's board rooms, assembly lines and study halls. Id. In fact, it is believed that crack
cocaine has suddenly become America's fastest growing drug epidemic and potentially its most
serious. Crack and Crime, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986, at 16. The national cocaine hotline
received a reported 2,200 calls per day as of June 1986. This figure almost doubles the peak
number of calls (1,200) received just a few months prior to June 1986. It is believed that about
one third of the calls received come from crack abusers. Crack: The Road Back, NEWSWEEK,
June 30, 1986, at 53.
126. Copies of the Agreement are available in the offices of the Dickinson Law Review.
127. Id. A player may file an appeal for reinstatement after two years with the approval
of both the Commissioner and the Players Association. To date, only one NBA player has been
permanently disqualified. In announcing the disqualification of Michael Ray Richardson, NBA
Commissioner David J. Stern stated:
My purpose today is to inform you that in tests where results were con-
firmed last evening, Michael Ray Richardson has tested positive for the presence
of cocaine in his system. As a result, under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the NBA and the Players Association, Michael Ray Richardson is per-
manently disqualified from playing in the National Basketball Association. The
test result in question confirms that Mr. Richardson has lapsed into drug usage
for a third time since January 1, 1984, the effective date of the anti-drug pro-
gram. As you know, three such instances require permanent disqualification.
Statement by NBA Commissioner David J. Stern (February 25, 1986) (on file at the Univer-
sity of Tennessee Law Library).
128. Telephone interview with Gary Bettman, Vice President and Legal Counsel for the
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The NBA offers seminars to support its belief that education
should be a major part of the program. 2 " The seminars discuss im-
proper drug use and its ramifications for athletes.13 Additionally,
the seminars facilitate an understanding of how to deal with players
with drug problems. 3' One objective of these seminars is to promote
openness and trust between athletes and counselors. 132
Under the program, voluntary treatment is encouraged. A
player, the team, or the league may initiate treatment. Upon release
the player is assigned a counselor in his team's home community, 33
and the player is required to attend group therapy at Narcotics
Anonymous.'3 In addition to weekly sessions, the player must also
attend private monthly sessions and quarterly group sessions. 35 If a
player misses one game, two flights, or two practices within a one-
week period, that player must report for a drug test within twenty-
four hours. 3' The entire program is run independently from the
league itself.
B. The National Football League
The National Football League (NFL) was established in
1920" as an unincorporated association of eleven teams whose
members voluntarily, without charter, formed an organization by
mutual consent for purposes of promoting common enterprises and
objectives. 3 s In 1961, Congress passed a law that exempted the
NFL from monopoly charges. 39 This law allowed the NFL to enter
into contracts on behalf of member teams."40 Acting on behalf of
member teams in 1982, the NFL entered into a collective bargaining
drug testing plan agreed to by the League and the National Football
League Players' Association (NFLPA). Commissioner Pete Rozelle
subsequently implemented a second program without the approval of
the NFLPA. The NFLPA claims Rozelle's program violates the col-
National Basketball Association (September 1986).




133. Id. at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 5-6.
137. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, THE NFL's OFFICIAL HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL
FOOTBALL 19 (T. Bennett ed. 1978) [hereinafter HISTORY OF FOOTBALL].
138. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Monopolies are made illegal by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
140. HISTORY OF FOOTBALL, supra note 137, at 32.
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lective bargaining agreement and has threatened a law suit. Ro-
zelle's program calls for two mandatory random tests during the sea-
son, in addition to the current preseason urinalysis.""
The collective bargaining plan requires one mandatory drug test
to be given with the standard physical examination." 2 The current
system does not require additional tests except when the club physi-
cian, upon reasonable cause, directs a player to Hazelden, the chosen
independent body for testing for chemical abuse or dependency
problems. There is no spot-checking for chemical abuse or depen-
dency by the club or the club physician. 3
C. The Baltimore Orioles
Although organized baseball has not yet arrived at a league-
level testing plan, various teams have introduced their own testing
programs. The substance abuse program of the Baltimore Orioles is
illustrative. The program was created to improve the public's percep-
tion of the players, while at the same time offering players assistance
when needed.1" It originated with Baltimore attorney/agent Ron
141. E. Brody & L. Weisman, Battle Lines Drawn Over Rozelle Plan, USA Today, July
8, 1986, at C-2, col. 1.
142. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL Management Council
and the National Football League Players Association § 6. Copies available in the offices of
the Dickinson Law Review.
143. Id. at § 7.
Commissioner Pete Rozelle attempted to implement random drug testing for NFL players
during the 1986 season. His plan required all players to take two unscheduled urinalysis tests
during the 1986 season. He announced the plan after unsuccessfully attempting to persuade
the players' union to subject themselves to a stronger drug program. The NFLPA resisted and
arbitration followed.
The arbitrator, Richard Kasher of Philadelphia, ruled that Rozelle's plan violated the
terms of the union contract with the players and could not be implemented. Kasher found that
the commissioner's authority to make rules was supplanted by specific language in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement that established clear procedures concerning the drug testing pro-
gram. The agreement allows testing during pre-season physical examinations, and "reasonable
cause" testing if there is reason to believe a player is on drugs. It rules out spot-checking for
drugs. Kasher concluded that such a drastic measure as random drug testing would have been
included in the agreement if it was intended to be used as a method of drug testing by the
negotiators.
Kasher went on to hold that parts of Rozelle's plan are reasonable and are not precluded
by the agreement. He allowed Rozelle to appoint a drug advisor to oversee the NFL's drug
program, and to designate a laboratory to conduct the drug tests. Kasher also cleared Rozelle's
plan to test draft-eligible players for drugs, and to subject "positive" test players to reasonable
cause testing at any time during the twelve months after the player signs an NFL contract.
Also, he ruled that the commissioner has the right to spell out the urinalysis tests permitted by
the agreement, including identification of such prohibited substances as marijuana, cocaine,
and steroids.
Finally, Kasher suggested that when the contract expired in 1987, the parties segregate
the drug issue from other issues in order to facilitate a more effective bargaining atmosphere.
He also approved all of Rozelle's plan as reasonable except for random testing.
144. G. Pomerantz & D. Sell, Union to Fight Drug Testing, Washington Post, January
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Shapiro, who represents at least twenty of the Orioles.'"
The program involves voluntary participation; once agreed upon,
it cannot be revoked. The designated physician has discretion to ad-
minister random drug tests.1" Between three to six tests are admin-
istered during a season in a manner that does not disrupt the team or
players' routine." 7 If a player tests positive, that player can request
corroboration of the results.148 If further tests are positive, the player
agrees to enter a program selected by a physician and the player's
attorney. 49 Although the team is notified when treatment requires
more than twenty-one days leave, it may not impose sanctions upon
a player who enters a treatment program. 50 The club is responsible




The NBA's program, as well as the current NFL system, 5 2 ap-
pears to be constitutionally permissible. The NBA places great em-
phasis on education and help for the athlete; the program is not
designed for punishment. 153 Furthermore, testing only occurs if the
team has a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse.' 5' The NFL tests at
the beginning of the season as part of a regularly scheduled medical
examination.
55
The Baltimore Orioles' program presents some difficulty; it pro-
vides for random tests as part of a voluntary program; once agreed
upon, participation cannot be revoked. 56 Should a player be sub-
jected to a drug test, with no "reasonable suspicion" requirement,
even though he agreed to it at one time? The issue then becomes the
player's waiver of a known right or privilege.' 57 If the player realized
29, 1986, at D-1, col. 1.
145. Copies of the Baltimore Substance Abuse Program are available in the offices of
the Dickinson Law Review.
146. Id.





152. The system proposed by Commissioner Rozelle, which provided for two mandatory,
random tests, would almost certainly fail a constitutional challenge. See supra note 143.
153. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
157. See Johnson v. Zobst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
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he was waiving a right, then no constitutional issue arises. 158 If, on
the other hand, the player did not understand his right to refuse test-
ing, a constitutional problem could arise.
V. Amateur Sports: Drug Testing Programs
A. The Requirement of State Action
In addition to the fourth amendment implications, drug testing
of amateur athletes raises additional constitutional questions. The
courts have scrutinized student-oriented rules and sanctions to deter-
mine their validity under the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.' 59 Whether drug testing rules
can withstand such a constitutional challenge merits discussion.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states
that "no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."'10 To determine whether drug testing
of student athletes violates the equal protection clause, it is first nec-
essary to decide the threshold question of whether that testing con-
stitutes state action. For an act by athletic governing bodies (such as
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), Statewide
High School Athletic Associations (SHSAA) and the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC)) to constitute state action, there must
be significant governmental involvement so that the challenged ac-
tion can be measured against the constitutional protection of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. 6' In United States v. Guest,"2 the
Supreme Court outlined the requisite level of involvement that con-
stitutes state action. According to the Court,
"[G]overnment action may be found even though the govern-
ment's involvement is not either exclusive or direct; government
action may be found even though the government's participation
was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative
forces leading to the constitutional violation."' 63
Government involvement has been found in the SHSAA and the
NCAA through the federal and state funding of those institutions,
even though they are private, voluntary associations.
158. Id.
159. See generally V. Carrafiello, Jocks Are People Too: The Constitution Comes To
the Locker Room, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 843 (1980).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
161. The fifth amendment is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
162. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
163. Id. at 755-56.
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The NCAA extensively regulates and supervises inter-collegiate
athletics, thereby providing an immeasurably valuable service for its
member institutions. The NCAA regulates the amateur status of
student athletes, sets financial aid policies, prescribes playing seasons
and minimum academic standards, and performs many other duties
as well. Although the NCAA is a private organization, courts have
found that its functions constitute state action under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
In Parish v. NCAA, 64 five college basketball players challenged
the constitutionality of the NCAA eligibility rule that required a
grade point average of 1.6. The players sought injunctive relief to
prevent the NCAA from enforcing its ruling that basketball players
with grade point averages lower than 1.6 were ineligible to compete
in NCAA-sponsored tournaments and televised games. The court
held that when state-supported educational institutions, their mem-
bers and officers play such an important role in the college athletic
association's programs, the activities of such an association consti-
tute action taken under color of state law. The court reasoned that
the NCAA, by assuming the role of coordinator and overseer of col-
lege athletics in the interest of both the individual students and of
the institution, is performing a traditional governmental function." 5
Other courts have also considered the NCAA's enforcement of
its rules and regulations to be state action. In Associated Students,
Inc. v. NCAA, 66 a student organization and individual students filed
suit against the NCAA because its eligibility rule limited participa-
tion in athletics to students with a minimum grade point average of
1.6. The court held that the enforcement actions of the NCAA con-
stituted state action and therefore were subject to the constraints of
the fourteenth amendment.1 67
When rules and regulations promulgated by statewide high
school athletic associations infringe upon an individual's constitu-
tional rights, courts have found a nexus linking the association's ac-
tion to state action. In Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities
164. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
165. Id. But see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) (where private individuals or groups exercise powers or carry out functions that are
governmental in nature, they become agents or instrumentalities of the state and are subject to
the fourteenth amendment).
166. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
167. Accord Howard University v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Williams v.
Hamilton, 497 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.H. 1980); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz.
1983).
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Association, Inc.,1 a female high school student requested and was
granted permission by school officials to participate on the school's
otherwise all male cross-country ski team. Prior to the team's first
meet, the plaintiff was informed that her participation was barred by
a Kansas State High School Activities Association rule. The plaintiff
filed suit under the civil rights laws claiming a deprivation of equal
protection. The court held that the State High School Athletic Ac-
tivities Association, a voluntary non-profit organization created to
regulate, supervise, promote and develop interscholastic activities of
secondary state schools, acts under color of state law. Therefore, its
actions constituted state action. The court reasoned that the associa-
tion uses public school funds to support itself, and that the associa-
tion has exclusive control over the state's athletic programs. Thus, its
actions are subject to treatment as state action.169
Courts have found violations of the fourteenth amendment in
cases in which the rules set up by a high school athletic association
deprived students of their equal protection rights. In Cape v. Tennes-
see Secondary School Athletic Association et. al,1 70 a female stu-
dent filed suit claiming that the State of Tennessee had denied her
the right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment. The plaintiff claimed that the rules for girls' bas-
ketball, created and enforced by the defendant athletic association,
were different from those applied to boys' basketball. The court
agreed that the rules violated the fourteenth amendment because
they denied a significant educational experience to a class of its citi-
zens solely on the basis of sex, with no rational justification for dif-
ferent treatment. The court also found the requisite nexus between
the State Athletic Association and the state, the actions of the asso-
ciation therefore constituting state action.
In cases involving the United States Olympic Committee, the
courts have not found the nexus between the government and the
committee to constitute state action. The United States Olympic
Committee is a corporation that was created and granted a federal
charter by Congress in 1950.171
In Defrantz v. United States Olympic Committee,1 7 2 twenty-five
athletes filed suit against the Olympic Committee for an injunction
168. 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974).
169. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
170. 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
171. United States Olympic Association Incorporation Act, Pub. L. No. 81-805, 64 Stat.
899 (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C.A. § 371 et seq. (1968 & Supp. 1987).
172. 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980).
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barring the Committee from carrying out a resolution not to send an
American team to participate in the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The
court, while acknowledging the Olympic Committee's federal char-
ter, considered the Committee to be a private defendant. The court
held that, since the federal government did not control the Commit-
tee, the Committee's decision not to send a team to the games did
not constitute state action and therefore did not give rise to an ac-
tionable claim for the infringement of a constitutional right. 7"
To find state action in an athletic governing board, courts have
agreed that there must be a nexus between the government and the
athletic board. This nexus must be sufficient to show that the
"[c]onduct that is formally private may become so entwined with
governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental char-
acter as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
upon state action. 1 74 Courts have been reluctant to find the neces-
sary nexus in cases involving the United States Olympic Committee;
however, in cases involving the NCAA and the SHSAA, the courts
have explicitly found such a nexus. Courts appear to look to funding
sources to make this determination. When funds that the participat-
ing schools pay to the organization for membership are derived from
federal and state financial aid, courts will find a nexus. In cases in
which no direct governmental funds are present, courts have failed to
find state action.
Once state action is determined to exist, equal protection chal-
lenges to drug testing of student athletes can be considered. The
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits a state from de-
nying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.' 7 5 The equal protection clause requires that persons in similar
circumstances be given equal protection with respect to the enjoy-
ment of personal rights and in the prevention and redress of wrongs.
The constitutional guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" means
that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of the laws that is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances in their lives, liberty, property and in their pursuit of
happiness. 76
173. See also Burton v. United States Olympic Committee, 574 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal.
1983).
174. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
175. See supra notes 72 and 153 and accompanying text.
176. See also Polar Ice Cream and Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 208 F. Supp. 899 (N.D.
Fla. 1962); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (equal protection of the
laws requires that all persons be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions).
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Equal protection is a difficult concept to define. No general defi-
nition would apply to all situations; therefore, equal protection ques-
tions must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The appropriate
standard for finding a violation of equal protection is whether the
classification created by a particular drug testing program bears
some reasonable relationship to the program's legitimate purposes.
In Reed v. Reed,17 the Supreme Court stated:
In applying [the equal protection clause], this Court has
consistently recognized that the fourteenth amendment does not
deny to states the power to treat different classes of persons in
different ways. The Equal Protection Clause . . . does, however,
deny to states the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that
statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all per-
sons in similar circumstances shall be treated alike." Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).1
7
1
A drug testing scheme violates the equal protection clause if it
provides for different treatment of similarly situated persons and if
that different treatment is not reasonably based on the legitimate
purpose of the scheme. Furthermore, the different treatment would
have to result in the violation of a person's rights, privileges and im-
munities as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
Neither an athlete's right to an education, nor the prospect of a
professional athletic career, has been deemed a fundamental consti-
tutional right. 17 9 Yet, assuming that a drug testing program does vi-
olate a student-athlete's constitutional rights, three questions remain
to be answered before there is a violation of the equal protection
clause. First, who is a "similarly situated person"? Are all student-
athletes on the same competitive level similarly situated? Are only
student-athletes in similar educational institutions (private, public,
size, etc.) similarly situated? Are coaches and trainers similarly situ-
ated with student-athletes? Second, what constitutes "different treat-
ment"? To treat persons who test positive for drug use differently
than those who do not is probably permissible. However, whether
random testing or even different treatment of those who test posi-
177. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
178. Id. at 75-6 (citations omitted).
179. See Drugs. Athletes, and the NCAA, supra note 12, at 219.
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tively would be constitutional is unclear. Finally, the determining
factor in deciding whether a given drug testing scheme violates the
equal protection clause is likely to be the legitimate purpose of the
scheme. If the scheme's purpose were to exclude from competition
all athletes who use drugs, the analysis would be very different from
that of a scheme whose purpose was merely to identify those athletes
who have a drug abuse problem in order to provide counseling, medi-
cal treatment and educational training.
As a whole, the equal protection issue asks "who should be sub-
jected to drug testing?" Ironically, those drug testing programs
designed to restore the integrity of athletics limit drug testing to
players. If the integrity of athletics were truly at stake, a more com-
plete drug testing program should include coaches, trainers, manag-
ers, and athletic directors. Furthermore, the question arises of why
there is a concerted effort to test athletes, while doctors, lawyers,
judges, politicians, and business executives-persons who hold posi-
tions requiring greater responsibility and attentiveness-are nor-
mally not suggested as candidates for drug testing.
In addition to equal protection, the fourteenth amendment also
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." ' The fourteenth amendment
is a limitation on state power, while the fifth amendment provides an
identical limitation on the powers of Congress. The concept of due
process of law has a dual aspect: substantive and procedural. The
due process clauses not only accord procedural safeguards to pro-
tected interests, but also protect substantive aspects of liberty
against impermissible governmental restrictions.8 1
The leading Supreme Court case on procedural due process is
Mathews v. Eldridge,"a2 in which the Court set out a three-prong
test for procedural due process requirements. In Mathews, the plain-
tiff challenged the constitutional validity of administrative proce-
dures used to assess a continued disability after a state agency termi-
nated his social security benefits. The Court held that due process
did not require an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of the
plaintiff's social security benefits. 8 ' However, the due process clause
did require analysis of three distinct factors: 1) the existence of a
private interest that will be affected by the official action; 2) the risk
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I.
181. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 404 U.S. 194 (1979).
182. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
183. Id.
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of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures
used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and 3) the nature of the governmental interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.1 8
The first step in any due process analysis is to identify the inter-
est involved, whether it is life, liberty or property.185 A student-ath-
lete's interest in life could not be affected by a mandatory drug test-
ing program; he is unlikely to have a liberty interest in participating
in collegiate athletics; nor is he likely to have a property interest in
that participation, especially since the athlete receives no compensa-
tion for his efforts. Nevertheless, a student's interest in participating
in sports may rise to a level deserving of due process protection be-
cause of the totality of the circumstances. Regardless of the type of
interest a student athlete has in athletic participation, that interest is
determined by state law.1
86
Other important factors to consider in a due process challenge
to a drug testing program by a public school include the degree of
deprivation imposed by the program on athletes who test positive,
and the degree to which notice and hearing are provided to those
athletes before sanctions are imposed. A drug testing program could
provide for penalties, including warnings; notification of coaches,
trainers or parents; further testing, suspension and expulsion. The
Supreme Court case of Goss v. Lopez 87 requires that, once a state
extends the right to education to public high school students in gen-
eral, due process requires that students be afforded notice and a
hearing before being suspended from school.' 88 The Court found that
students facing temporary suspension from a public school have
property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the
due process clause. The Court went on to say that:
Since misconduct charges "[ijf sustained and recorded
could seriously damage the students' reputations as well as inter-
fere with their later educational and employment opportunities,"
the state's claimed right "to determine unilaterally and without
process whether the misconduct has occurred" immediately col-
184. Id. at 321.
185. See generally Drugs, Athletes, and the NCAA, supra note 12.
186. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
187. id.
188. Id.
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lides with the due process clause's deprivation of liberty.189
The Court also maintained that neither the property interest in
the educational benefit temporarily denied, nor the liberty interest in
reputation, is so insubstantial that suspensions constitutionally may
be imposed by a procedure the school chooses. 9' Thus, if the dam-
age to a student-athlete's reputation or educational benefits by sanc-
tions imposed under a drug testing program is substantial, the school
would likely have to provide notice and a hearing prior to the imposi-
tion of such sanctions.19" '
The unreliability of drug testing is perhaps the best argument
for due process procedural requirements prior to sanctions against a
student-athlete tested for drugs. The Centers for Disease Control es-
timated that roughly half of the drug tests performed by the nation's
thirteen largest laboratories were unsatisfactory." 2 This means that,
even under the most sophisticated drug testing procedures now avail-
able, many student-athletes accused of using illegal drugs could be
innocent. In addition, the vast majority of drug testing programs do
not use the most technologically advanced procedures because of the
expense involved. As a result, most drug testing will have a margin
of error greater than ten percent. It seems incredible that a drug
testing program could provide for the arbitrary imposition of sanc-
tions when the margin of error is known to be so high.
B. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
The goal of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) drug program is to provide clean, fair competition in
championship and post-season bowl games. 9 To facilitate this ob-
jective and to prevent drug-induced advantages, the NCAA uses
urinalysis to determine if banned drugs are being used to enhance
performance.9
Through the use of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, the
NCAA analyzes urine samples.' 95 Its Executive Committee oversees
the program that is used at championship and post-season bowl
189. Id. at 574-75 (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 575-76. See also Brewer v. Austin Independent School Dist., 779 F.2d 260
(5th Cir. 1985) (student charged with misconduct may not be suspended from a public school
without minimum procedures required by the due process clause).
191. Id.
192. See FORBES, August 11, 1986, at 102.
193. NCAA Drug-Testing Program, at 1. This plan was passed April I, 1986. Copies
are available at the office of the Dickinson Law Review.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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games.' 96 The NCAA imposes penalties on all athletes with positive
tests results; the penalties are consistent with existing policies in the
NCAA By-Laws. 9 ' The NCAA also imposes penalties on athletic
personnel and programs when there was knowledge of the drug
use. 198 All athletes are subject to testing upon entering a post-season
athletic event. 199 Typically, the top team or individual will be tested
along with other randomly-selected teams and individual athletes.200
C. The United States Olympic Committee
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) observes essen-
tially the same list of banned drugs as the International Olympic
Committee.20 1 The list is extensive and may even include common
over-the-counter drugs such as Co-Tylenol and decongestants. 202 The
primary focus of the USOC's attack is on central nervous system
stimulants, pain killers, antibiotics, steroids, alcohol and certain beta
blockers. The USOC also focuses on drugs that may be used in
blood-doping. 2 3 Any discovered use of banned drugs results in a loss
of eligibility for at least six months for a first offense, and at least
four years for a repeat offense.204
VI. Policy Considerations: The Conflict
Only four years have passed since the dreaded year described by
George Orwell in his futuristic prophecy, 1984. Yet there is already
substantial evidence of government support and public interest in




199. As of January 1987, two suits had been filed against the NCAA challenging the
drug testing program. LSU Football player Roland Barbay brought an action after he was
banned from participating in the Sugar Bowl because he tested positive for steroids. His suit
was dismissed because of discrepancies in his statements as to when he used the steroids.
The American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on behalf of Simone Levant, captain
of the Stanford University Women's Diving Team, who was barred from all diving events
because she refused to consent to urinalysis testing. The suit charged that drug testing of
student athletes is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. In Levant, the court issued a prelim-
inary injunction preventing the NCAA from imposing sanctions upon Levant. She had refused
to submit to drug testing prior to the NCAA diving championships. The NCAA did not appeal
the ruling. The issue was mooted when Levant failed to qualify for the diving championships.
See Levant, No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Mar. I1, 1987).
200. NCAA Drug Testing Program, supra note 193, at 4. Recently, the legal challenges
to the NCAA's drug testing program have intensified. See The Chronicle of Higher Education,
August 5, 1987, at I, col. 2; SPORT MAGAZINE, May 1987, at 6.
201. USOC Committee Report, March 10, 1986, at 1.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1-2. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 4.
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Government and private employees are given lie detector tests; motor
vehicle operators are given random sobriety tests; armed services
members are tested for exposure to the AIDS virus; and athletes and
others are tested for drug abuse.
Economic considerations play an important role in the height-
ened interest in testing. Drug use is costing the American economy
over $30 billion each year in employee illness, absenteeism, poor
workmanship, low productivity, and work theft. 5 Increasingly, team
owners and sports association executives see player performance suf-
fer because of drug abuse, and they are moving to discourage drug
use.
2 0 6
That bus drivers, airplane pilots, prison guards and other per-
sons holding positions involving public safety may be drug users can
send chills of anxiety down the spine of even the most ardent sup-
porter of constitutional liberties. Why then, is a major focus of the
war on drugs on the sports front? Athletes clearly are not the only
persons using illegal drugs. It is the nation's love affair with sports
that makes athletes natural leaders and excellent vehicles for press-
ing the anti-drug crusade. Despite this fact, important values such as
privacy must be balanced with the public concerns. Furthermore, it
is clear that tests may irreparably harm players.2 07 The inaccuracy
of drug testing risks false accusations; and testing itself tends to
arouse public notions of guilt, rather than of possible innocence.
The issue becomes whether the dangers that drug testing seeks
to contain are greater than the assault on constitutional liberties'that
drug testing has become. Whereas the legal aspects of this issue
must be resolved within the political and judicial process, its scien-
tific and technical aspects must also be examined.
Roger P. Maickel, Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at
Purdue University, states that the results of urinary drug tests are
incorrect as often as fifteen to twenty percent of the time.20 8 Dr.
James Woodford, an Atlanta chemist with a Schedule I license from
the Drug Enforcement Administration, suggests that an unusually
high number of blacks test positive in random drug testing; "mela-
nin," the substance responsible for skin pigmentation, is present in
205. See How Drugs Zap the Nation's Strength, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May
16, 1983, at 55.
206. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
207. See infra note 216 and accompanying text; see also supra note 192 and accompa-
nying text.
208. USA TODAY, February 1987, at 13. An internal military investigation uncovered
sloppy practice which left in doubt the results of 46,000 positive urine samples from Army
personnel in 1982-83. See FORBES, Aug. 11, 1986, at 102.
DRUG TESTING AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
urine and is often mistakenly identified as marijuana. 0 9 Further-
more, legitimate drugs and even some natural foods can cause urine
to test positive.210
Dr. Peggy Alsup, former medical director of Medicaid for the
State of Tennessee, stated the problem a different way:
Drug testing, on its face, is nothing but a diagnostic tool
like any other test, but what makes it different is that it gives
the false hope that we are getting to the root of the problem.
Nothing is further from the truth. What we will have is another
industry, the drug testing industry. 1'
Another problem emerges as well. According to Dr. Alsup, most co-
caine use is traceable for only one day and marijuana use for only a
few days. Even comprehensive testing may fail to show relatively re-
cent drug use.212
A fair and practical alternative to random mandatory drug test-
ing is needed. Testing programs such as those proposed at a recent
conference on drug testing sponsored by the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) appear promising from the perspective of both
employers and employees.21 3 In fact, the NIDA program captures
the spirit of the Baltimore Orioles' program." 4 NIDA's program
limits initial testing to persons in special situations, such as workers
whose jobs pose a risk to others; even then the program tests only
when there is strong evidence of abuse. In addition, workers are noti-
fied that they are being tested for drugs; and all positive results are
confirmed by further tests.215 Test results are confidential and reha-
bilitation is stressed.
Despite efforts to develop plans that provide notice and that
overcome other objections, many people, including athletes, continue
to oppose most plans. One commentator, Fern Schimer Chapman,
openly opposes the NFL's proposed drug testing program and has
quoted Boston Red Sox pitcher, Bob Stanley, as saying: "I don't take
drugs, and I don't believe I should have to piss in a bottle to prove I
don't."2 '6 While Mr. Stanley's comments are understandable, they
209. Letter of James Woodford (on file at the University of Tennessee College of Law).
210. USA TODAY, February 1987, at 13.
211. Conversation with Dr. Peggy Alsup (June 15, 1986).
212. Id.
213. Sitomer, Drug Testing. Balancing Private Rights With Public Safety, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, May 8, 1986, at 23.
214. Copies of the NIDA proposed programs are on file at the offices of the Dickinson
Law Review.
215. See Sitomer, supra note 213.
216. F.S. Chapman, Tests Harm Players By Violating Privacy, USA Today, July 15,
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overlook the fact that testing does not arise out of malice or insensi-
tivity, but rather out of the failure of drug testing supporters to un-
derstand that the technology is inadequate to prevent false accusa-
tions. For this reason, among others, screening is often counter-
productive.
The constitutional implications for a free society are self-evident
and testing is an exceedingly dangerous procedure. Testing without
probable cause requires setting aside the important constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Testing con-
flicts with other important constitutional guarantees as well, such as
privacy, due process and equal protection.
VII. A Model Drug Testing Program
Few persons would dispute the fact that a significant number of
athletes, both college and professional, have used performance-en-
hancing and recreational drugs. Even so, the rush to test for drug use
raises broad concerns about the potential for trampling important
constitutional rights. There is little question that persons have a con-
stitutionally protected expectation of privacy in their bodily func-
tions. Urine tests, for example, undoubtedly raise constitutional con-
cerns even if they are completely accurate; however, numerous
studies report error factors exceeding twenty-five percent of those
tested.
Is there a model drug testing plan that does not violate the con-
stitutional rights of athletes? Such a plan might well require the
following:
1) Across-the-board testing of all athletic personnel - in-
cluding trainers, coaches, and management - in order to make
drug testing truly a condition of employment;
2) A limited number of tests during the course of the sea-
son, or a single preseason drug test with the physical
examination;
3) No random testing without the subject's consent, unless:
(a) testing is limited to substances that pose a sig-
nificant health risk to the athlete, trainer or coach;
(b) testing is limited to quantities of the substance
at which there is a substantial health risk;
(c) probable cause triggers the random testing in
the first place; and
(d) there is a reasonable alternative for the individ-
1986, at IOA, col. I.
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ual subjected to random testing, such as a release form
waiving liability of coaches, management, league, etc.,
so the subject could compete at his or her own risk; or a
policy by which the subject could refuse to take the test
and forfeit participation on that particular day. Any
penalties or sanctions for non-participation because of
refusal to take a drug test should be incorporated as a
team policy in each testing subject's contract;
4) The development of a drug testing policy outlining the
procedures and purposes behind the policy;
5) Drug testing by the least intrusive medical procedures,
i.e., saliva test, urine test, blood test in that order;
6) All drug testing - whether based on probable cause or
previously scheduled - limited to those substances that pose a
significant health hazard to the athlete, trainer or coach. The
tests might differentiate between the type of subject tested, since
the same substance causes different health risks to the athlete,
trainer, and coach. Additionally, trainers and coaches would be
less likely to be subjected to the adverse effects of performance-
enhancing drugs;
7) Drug testing programs should be conducted and adminis-
tered only by professional medical personnel. Results should be
reported only as positive or negative, and the medical personnel
should take appropriate actions based on standards of accepted
medical practice. Medical personnel should be in-house and
have independent judgment. As long as the results were confi-
dential, such testing might even be conducted by the governing
sports body, e.g., NFL, NHL, NBA, NCAA, etc.;
8) Drug testing results should not be made public to anyone
outside of the sport itself under any circumstances. The press
should be denied the specific medical data that the drug testing
program yields;
9) Before any drug testing program is implemented, there
should be effective legal guarantees that grand juries and prose-
cutors cannot gain access to the information. However, the evi-
dence should be admissible in civil cases, so that drug testing
results would not be fabricated in order to escape unfavorable or
unprofitable contracts. Placing control of the program solely in
the hands of qualified medical professionals also should help pre-
vent misuse of sensitive information.
A drug testing program like the one outlined above would sub-
stantially prevent potential violations of the constitutional rights of
athletic personnel. The effectiveness of such a program depends on
its purpose. The proposed program would be most effective if the
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purpose is, first and foremost, to protect the athletic personnel from
health risks and potential injury. Conversely, the model program
would be a dismal failure if its purpose were to reassure the public
that athletes do not use drugs. The effectiveness of a drug testing
program also depends upon its degree of intrusiveness. The more in-
trusive the drug testing program, the more likely that the program
will violate the constitutional rights of athletic personnel. This is es-
pecially true of mandatory programs. The key to the effectiveness of
any program to reduce drug and alcohol abuse is cooperation - not
force, intrusion or punishment. The more voluntary a program is, the
more likely it is to succeed. Drug testing, by itself, is of no value. To
be effective, testing must be coupled with educational services, coun-
seling and medical treatment.
Drug testing will be disastrous for all concerned so long as its
purpose is solely to allay public fears of widespread drug abuse by
athletes. It is undeniable that a problem of drug and alcohol abuse
exists in athletics. It is equally undeniable that the same problem
exists in our society as a whole. Drug testing will produce positive
results only if the health and well-being of the athlete or other test
subject is the primary concern. Invariably, drug testing will be most
successful in a program of voluntary participation designed to help
those who recognize that they have a problem and genuinely desire
help. Since education, counseling and medical treatment are already
available for most athletic personnel, it is questionable why drug
testing programs should be implemented at all.
VIII. Conclusion
Drug abuse is not a problem that is limited to sports enterprises;
it is an American problem. Like any efforts at ameliorating problems
in society, the factor critical to success rests in the objectives sought:
What do drug testing programs seek to accomplish? If the programs
seek to rid athletics of the menace of drugs or athletes who abuse
drugs, they are likely to fail. Athletes who depend on drugs will find
ways to avoid the testing procedures, or they may resort to the use of
drugs that are not detectable by available procedures. Furthermore,
studies suggest that at least one of every ten athletes who test posi-
tive for the presence of illegal drugs are in fact drug-free. What will
become of them? Good programs take into account the possibility of
laboratory error and readily offer re-testing opportunities.
Drug testing procedures, as a whole, should give way to counsel-
ing and treatment. After all, drug testing procedures are not effec-
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tive weapons in the war against drugs in the United States. Athletes
should not be required to risk their future careers in athletics and
their reputations as citizens because of mandatory drug testing pro-
grams of dubious worth. Mandatory testing is a serious intrusion into
the athlete's constitutionally protected zone of privacy. There is little
evidence that current voluntary drug abuse programs are less effec-
tive than mandatory programs. Most voluntary programs offer coun-
seling, education, support, and treatment for athletes.
If the objective of a drug testing program is the restoration of
confidence and integrity in athletes, the objective must be achieved
without mandatory drug testing that violates dignity, legal rights and
common sense. And while there can be little objection to coaches
and owners focusing on player performance, barring a player from
competition does not offer to the player the treatment and rehabilita-
tion that he needs.
Penalties and sanctions on the user are not likely to win the war
on drugs. Compulsory testing for illicit drug use simply passes on the
responsibility while the root causes remain.

